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Abstract 
 
In Stackelberg-like games there is an advantage of moving first. However, Bagwell 
(1995) shows that this result may not hold if the second player can make only imperfect 
observations. We explore whether this paradox also holds when the advantage comes 
from forward induction arguments in the class of outside option games. JEL numbers: 
C72. 
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1. Introduction 
Bagwell (1995) shows that the advantage of moving first may disappear when actions 
are not perfectly observed by the player moving second. When the advantage is due to 
forward induction reasoning, Ferreira (2010) finds that whether it is lost or not depends 
on the particular game. It is, therefore, of interest to know in which games the 
introduction of noise destroys the forward induction selection and in which games it 
does not. In this work we study with detail the class of outside option games. 
The intuitive idea in forward induction says that, when a player moves first, she must be 
able to induce her preferred equilibrium when her action clearly indicates which one it 
is. However, it is hard to translate this idea into a formal, universal definition. Van 
Damme (1989) provides a definition for outside option games, but when noise is 
introduced in a game in this class, the new game does not belong to it and the definition 
no longer applies. 
Thus, we use instead the concepts of iterative elimination of dominated strategies, 
IEDS, and of equilibrium evolutionarily stable set, EESS. We show that the selection 
made by IEDS in the outside option game is preserved in the noise game. Because 
whenever IEDS selects a unique equilibrium, it satisfies van Damme's definition we 
then have that the selection in the noise game also selects the “intuitive” forward 
induction compatible equilibrium. Next we show that the concept of EESS makes the 
same selection in the game without and with noise. This is interesting because EESS is 
always compatible with van Damme's definition in the game without noise. 
These two results show that the advantage of forward induction is not lost with the 
addition of noise in outside option games. 
2. Games with an outside option 
Following van Damme, in an outside option game, oΓ , Player 1 plays first by choosing 
between actions I and O. If she plays O the game ends. If she chooses I a simultaneous 
game between herself and Player 2 follows, in which iA  denotes Player i's strategy set. 
Within this class of games, an equilibrium s in which Player 1 plays O is said to satisfy 
the forward induction criterion if the following does not occur: there is precisely one 
equilibrium in which Player 1 chooses I that gives this player a strictly better payoff 
than s. 
We define the noise game associated with an outside option game, NoΓ , as follows. First 
Player 1 chooses between actions I and O, then nature produces a signal },{ oi∈φ  with 
εφφ −==== 1)Pr()Pr( OoIi . If Player 1 has selected I she now has to choose a 
strategy for the simultaneous game, whereas if she selected O she does nothing else. 
Player 2 observes the signal φ  but not the choice of Player 1, then he chooses a strategy 
within his strategy set in the simultaneous game after any observation. For instance, if 
Player 1 selected O, Player 2 still has to make his decision as he does not know for sure 
that the game ended. Notice that in the noise game the strategy set for Player 2 is 
222 AAS ×= , where 2'222 ¡ Saas ∈=  indicates that Player 2 plays 2a  after observing 
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i=φ , and '2a  after o=φ . Finally, abusing notation we will denote by (.)iu  the utility 
of player i in both games. The arguments in the utility function will clearly indicate the 
game of reference. 
3. The iterative elimination of dominated strategies 
The noise game defined after an outside option game does not have the structure of an 
outside option game and van Damme's definition of forward induction is not applicable. 
However we can still apply other definitions. First we explore IEDS, as it is well known 
that whenever IEDS selects one equilibrium in outside option games this equilibrium 
satisfies van Damme's criterion. Next we show that IEDS selects basically the same 
equilibria in the games with and without noise. 
Definition 1. A strategy is  is dominated by 
'
is  if ),(),(
'
iiiiii ssussu −− ≤  for all is− , and 
),(),( ''' iiiiii ssussu −− <  for some ' is− . 
Denote by )(iΓ  the game that results after eliminating all the dominated strategies in the 
game )1( −Γ i , where Γ=Γ )0( . We say that is  survives IEDS in the game Γ if is  is a 
strategy in the game )(∞Γ . 
Proposition 1. An outside option game has only one equilibrium ),( 21 as  that survives 
IEDS if and only if all the equilibria than survive IEDS in the noise game when ε  is 
small enough are of the form ),( '221 aas . 
Proof: 
We proceed in four steps. 
(i) The strategy profile ),( 21 as  is an equilibrium in oΓ  if and only if ),( '221 aas  is an 
equilibrium in NoΓ  for ε  small enough. 
Consider ),(),( '22
'
11
'
2211 aasuaasu ≥  for all 1'1 Ss ∈ . By definition of NoΓ  it is equivalent 
to ),(),()1(),(),()1( '2
'
112
'
11
'
211211 asuasuasuasu εεεε +−≥+−  for all 1'1 Ss ∈ , which 
holds if and only if ),(),( 2
'
11211 asuasu ≥  for all 1'1 Ss ∈  if ε  is small enough. 
The proof for Player 2 is entirely similar. 
(ii) The strategy profile ),( 21 as  contains no dominated strategies in oΓ  if and only if 
),( 221 aas , ),(
'
221 aas  and ),( 2
'
21 aas  contain no dominated strategies in 
N
oΓ  for all 
2
'
2 Aa ∈  if ε  is small enough. 
Assume 11 Ss ∈  is dominated by 1'1 Ss ∈  in oΓ , then ),(),( 2'11211 asuasu ≤  for all 
22 Aa ∈  and ),(),( '2'11'211 asuasu <  for some 2'2 Aa ∈ . Then, 
),(),()1(),(),()1( ''2
'
112
'
11
''
211211 asuasuasuasu εεεε +−≤+−  for all 2''22 , Aaa ∈  and 
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),(),()1(),(),()1( '2
'
11
'
2
'
11
'
211
'
211 asuasuasuasu εεεε +−<+−  for 2'2 Aa ∈ . The last 
inequalities are equivalent to saying that 11 Ss ∈  is dominated in NoΓ . 
To proceed with Player 2’s strategy, consider that 22 Aa ∈  is dominated by 2'2 Aa ∈  in 
oΓ , then ),(),( '212212 asuasu ≤  for all 1s , and ),(),( '2'122'12 asuasu <  for some '1s . 
Clearly 1
'
1 AIs ×∈  as ),( 212 sOau  does not depend on 2s . Since 
),(),( 2212212 aasuasu =  for all 2a  it is immediate that 22aa  is dominated by '2'2aa . To 
see that '22aa  is dominated assume that 11 AIs ×∈  (if not, the weak inequality follows 
immediately) and write ),,(),(),()1(),( '212
'
212212
'
2212 asuasuasuaasu ≤+−= εε  for all 
1s  if and only if ),,(),(
'
212212 asuasu ≤  for all 1s . The inequality is strict for the same 
'
1s  that satisfies ),(),(
'
2
'
122
'
12 asuasu <  as long as 0>ε . To show that 2'2aa  is 
dominated by '2
'
2aa  proceed similarly and notice that in this case it must be that 1<ε . 
The converse, if 22aa , 
'
22aa  and 2
'
2aa  are dominated by 
'
2
'
2aa  then 2a  is dominated by 
'
2a , is trivial. 
(iii) If '22aa  is not dominated in 
N
oΓ  then 22aa  and '2'2aa  are not dominated either. 
This is straightforward as the conditions for domination of '22aa  are a convex 
combination of the conditions for 22aa  and 
'
2
'
2aa . 
(iv) Steps (ii) and (iii) before guarantee that, once a strategy ii Ss ∈  is eliminated in oΓ  
it is also eliminated in NoΓ , and vice versa. This way, by induction, the IEDS eliminates 
the same strategies in )()( toΓ  and in )()( tNoΓ  (the induction argument is just the 
repetition of (ii) and (iii) for 1>t ). To complete the proof note now that, if there exists 
an equilibrium that survives IEDS in NoΓ  that is of the form ),( '2''21 aas  with 2''2 aa ≠ , 
then, by (i), ),( ''21 as  is an equilibrium in 0Γ  and, also by (i) ),( ''2''21 aas  is an equilibrium 
in NoΓ . By (ii) it follows that ),( ''2''21 aas  survives IEDS in NoΓ  and, again by (ii) so does 
),( ''21 as  in 0Γ , in contradiction with the fact that ),( 21 as  is the only equilibrium in 0Γ . 
Q.E.D. 
4. The equilibrium evolutionarily stable set 
Next we consider the equilibrium evolutionarily stable set, EESS. In the language of 
evolutionary games, an EESS has to be immune to entry by a small proportion of 
mutants whose strategy is a best reply to the strategy of the post-entry population. More 
precisely, in a two-player game, let 21 Σ×Σ=Σ  denote the set of mixed strategy profiles 
and let )()()( 21 sss Β×Β=Β  denote the set of mixed best replies against s, then we can 
write the following definition. 
Definition 2 (Swinkels, 92). The set Σ⊂Θ  is an EESS if it is a minimal closed and 
non-empty set of Nash equilibria that satisfies 
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(S) there exists 0'>δ  such that for all )',0( δδ ∈ , for all Θ∈s , and for all 
Σ∈'s  
Θ∈+−⇒+−Β∈ ')1()')1((' sssss δδδδ . 
In the class of generic outside option games where the only equilibrium that satisfies 
van-Damme's definition of forward induction requires Player 1 not to choose “out”, 
Hauk and Hurkens (2002) show that EESS also selects this equilibrium (this is not true 
for other refinements). Let us denote this class of games by oΓ . The next proposition 
shows that the same outcome is obtained by EESS if noise is added. 
Lemma. Let ),(' '2
'
1 sss = be a strategy profile in game oΓ , and let ),( ''2'2'1 sss  be a 
strategy profile in game NoΓ . Then 
)),(),)(1((),(' '2
'
121
'
2
'
1 sssssss δδ +−Β∈=  
if and only if 
)),(),)(1((),( '2
'
2
'
1
'
221
'
2
'
2
'
1 sssssssss δδ +−Β∈ . 
Proof. It is straightforward to check that the implications hold for the best response of 
Player 1. For Player 2, the first relation means 
),)1((),)1(( ''2
'
112
'
2
'
112 sssusssu δδδδ +−≥+−                              (1) 
for all 2
''
2 Σ∈s . The second relation means 
),)1((),)1(( '''2
''
2
'
112
'
2
'
2
'
112 ssssussssu δδδδ +−≥+−                         (2) 
 for all 22
'''
2
''
2 Σ×Σ∈ss . The right hand sides of inequalities (1) and (2) have the same 
maximum. The left hand side of (2) is calculated as 
),)1((),)1(()1( '''2
'
112
''
2
'
112 sssusssu δδεδδε +−++−− . 
It is now trivial to check that both inequalities hold at the same time. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2. Let )},{( 21 ss=Θ  constitute the only EESS of oΓ , then the set 
)},{( 221 sss  is the only EESS of 
N
oΓ . 
Proof. Consider a set NΘ  that is an EESS of NoΓ  and suppose that Nsss Θ∈),( 221 . If, in 
addition, we have that 
)),(),)(1((),( ''2
'
2
'
1221
''
2
'
2
'
1 sssssssss δδ +−Β∈ ,   (3) 
 then, by (S) it must also be that 
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Nssssss Θ∈+− ),(),)(1( ''2'2'1221 δδ . 
Notice that ''2s  is played with probability ε . Then, by the closedness of NΘ  this implies 
Nssssss Θ∈+− ),(),)(1( '2'2'1221 δδ . 
This in turn implies Θ∈+− ),(),)(1( '2'121 ssss δδ  by Lemma 1. But this is a 
contradiction if ),(),( '2
'
121 ssss ≠  as )},{( 21 ss=Θ . Thus, the only possibility for 
strategy 's  to satisfy (3) is to be of the form ),( '''221
' ssss = . But now, if 
)),(),)(1((),( '''221221
'''
221 sssssssss δδ +−Β∈ , 
it is also true that 
)),(),)(1((),( '''221221221 sssssssss δδ +−Β∈ , 
in contradiction with the genericity of the game oΓ  (that is translated into the game NoΓ ) 
if 2
'''
2 ss ≠ . Hence we have shown that if Nsss Θ∈),( 221  then Nsss Θ∈)},{( 221 , and 
condition (S) is trivially satisfied, and so are closedness and minimality. Finally, no 
other EESS can exist in NΘ  as, repeating the arguments above, this would contradict the 
uniqueness of Θ . Q.E.D. 
5. Discussion 
The addition of noise may destroy the appeal of forward induction arguments, as shown 
in Ferreira (2010). However, for outside option games we have shown that this is not 
the case. The formal definition of forward induction for this class of games cannot be 
applied to the noise game. To make sense of the statement that “forward induction is not 
lost in the outside option games” we work with definitions that are compatible with 
forward induction in this class of games. We show that these definitions, namely IEDS 
and EESS, when applied in the noise game choose the counterpart of the equilibria that 
are compatible with forward induction in the original game. 
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